





Trinko, a local telecommunications services customer of
AT&T, sued Verizon for anti-competitively raising the costs of
AT&T, Verizon's rival in the market for local telecommunications
services. Pursuant to the rules of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, AT&T was leasing parts of the local telecommunications net-
work (unbundled network elements, "UNEs") from Verizon at "cost
plus reasonable profit" prices. The Supreme Court held that
Trinko's complaint failed to state a claim under § 2 of the Sherman
Act, and dismissed the complaint. I argue that the Court drew in-
.correct inferences from its AsPen Skiing decision. The Court also
missed a key vertical leveraging issue in Trinko. The opening of
competition mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996
challenged Verizon's traditional monopoly in the local telecommu-
nications services market. By raising the cost and/or decreasing
the quality of the service of rivals in the retailing services market,
Verizon aimed to preserve that monopoly. As a result of these ef-
forts, rivals suffered a disadvantage. Yet Verizon also caused retail-
ing rivals to lease a lower number of unbundled network elements
and thus incurred a revenue sacrifice. Therefore the actions ofVer-
izon in raising the costs of retailing telecommunications services ri-
vals are an indication of. liability according to the. "sacrifice
principle" proposed in the Government's brief in Trinko, according
to which a defendant is liable if its conduct "involves a sacrifice of
short-term profits or goodwill that makes sense only insofar as it
helps the defendant maintain or obtain monopoly power," even
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I.
INTRODUCTION
The Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices oj Curti~ V.
Trinkol decision is a major interpretation by the Supreme Court of
the conditions uJ}der which a Sherman Act section 2 monopoliza-
tion violation can be sustained.2 Trinko, a purchaser of local tele-
communications services from AT&T, sued Verizon for raising the
costs of and otherwise disadvantaging AT&T through anti-competi-
tive ac:tions.3 AT&T, which was Verizon's rival in the retail local
telecommunications services market, was leasing parts of the local
telecommunications network infrastructure, or unbundled network
elements (hereinafter "UNEs"), from Verizon according to the
rules of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. These rules imposed
on the leases a '1ust and reasonable rate. . . based on the cost".that
"may include a reasonable profit" and a requirement that the rate
1. 540 U.S.398 (2004).
2. Seegenerallyid.
3. Id. at 402-05.
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be "nondiscriminatory."4 The Supreme Court held that Trinko's
complaint failed to state a claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act.5 In
doing so, the Court drew incorrect inferences from its decision in
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.6
The Court also missed a key vertical leveraging issue in Trinko.
Verizon leveraged its monopoly of local telecommunications net-
work infrastructure by raising the costs or decreasing the quality of
services of rival local telecommunications services providers (such
as AT&T) who leased UNEs from Verizon, placing such rivals at a
disadvantage. In this manner, Verizon used actions that raised the
costs of rivals to preserve its monopoly in the local telecommunica-
tions services market. But Verizon also caused a lower number of
leases of UNEs to be leased to retailing rivals, and thus incurred a
revenue sacrifice. Therefore, the actions of Verizon create liability
under the "sacrifice principle" proposed in the Government's brief
in Trinko, whereby a defendant is liable if its conduct "involves a
sacrifice of short-term profits or goodwill that makes sense. only in-
sofar as it helps the defendant maintain or obtain monopoly
power."7
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Part II discusses
the recent evolution of telecommunications in the United States,
including the breakup of AT&T in 1981 and the major regulatory
reform introduced in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its
implementation. This part also defines and explains the "vertical
price squeeze" and "raising rivals' costs" strategies and shows how
these strategies may have been implemented in the 1981-96 period
in the absence of the judicially imposed business line restrictions
created with the breakup of AT&T in 1981.8 This part also de-
scribes the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its implementa-
tion. Part III summarizes the Supreme Court's Trinko decision.
Part IV discusses issues and problems arising from the Trinko deci-
sion. Part V discusses the vertical leveraging issues in Trinko, in-
cluding foreclosure through a vertical price squeeze as well as
through raising rivals' costs. Part VI discusses the application of the
4. Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1) (1996).
5. Trinka, 540 U.S. at 416.
6. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
7. Brief of Amici Curiae United States and the Federal Trade Commission at
16, Verizon Communications 1nc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398
(2004) (No. 02-682). .
8. The decision that finalized the antitrust suit of the United States against
AT&T and formalized the 1981 AT&T breakup was United States v. American Tel.
and Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.C. Cir. 1982) [hereinafter "Modification ofFinal
, Judgment" or "MFJ"].382 NYU ANNUAL SURVEYOF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 61:379
"sacrifice principle" in antitrust law.
remarks.




A. The 1981 Breakup ofAT&T
To understand the context of the Trinko case, we need to ex-
amine the markets for telecommunications services in the United
States going back to the breakup of AT&T in 1981. The U.S. De-
partment of Justice (USDOJ or Department of Justice) filed a
landmark antitrust suit against AT&T, UnitedStatesv. American Tele-
phone and TelegraphCO.,9in 1974.10 Mter a long antitrust battle, in
1981 AT&T agreed to break up into eight companies with very lim-
ited competition among them.l1 Emerging from the 1981 breakup,
AT&T's long distance service company retained the AT&T name
while Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific Bell,
Southwestern Bell ("SBC"), and US West (collectively, the Regional
Bell Operating Companies, hereinafter "RBOCs") were created
with legally protected monopolies in their respective local telecom-
munications services markets.J2 A number of facilities-based com-
petitors that owned their own networks - such as MCI, Sprint,
Qwest, Level 3, and Williams - entered the long distance market
along with hundreds of long distance resellers. Advances in the la-
ser electronics used in fiber-optic transmission also allowed in-
stalled networks to enhance their transmission technology.
Significant increases in the number of competitors and in the long
9. 642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
10. The government's allegations, among others, were that (i) AT&T's rela-
tionship with Western Electric was illegal, and (ii) AT&T monopolized the long
distance market. The DO] sought divestiture of both manufacturing and long dis-
tance from local service. For a summary discussion of UnitedStates v. AT&T, see
generally Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Usesof Regulation:
United States v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS
Uohn E. Kwoka & La"l'.'fence]. White eds., 2d ed. Harper Collins, 1999).
11. SeegenerallyMF], supra note 8.
12. In 1984, the seven RBOCs had approximately 89% of local lines. GTE, a
company independent of AT&T, was a monopolist in most of the remaining lines.
AT&T's market share of local lines had remained almost constant since regulation
was established by the middle 1930s. SeegenerallyNoll & Owen, supra note 10;
David Gabel &David F. Weiman, HistoricalPerspectives on Competitionand Interconnec-
tion betweenLocalExchangeCarriers(Sept. 1995) (manuscript on file with the NYU
Annual Survey of American Law); David Gabel, Competitionin a NetworkIndustry:





















distance network capacity resulted in vigorous competition in long
distance service, and, in 1995, the Federal Communications Com-
mission declared AT&T to be a "non-dominant" carrier.13 Despite
network ownership fragmentation, regulations imposed mandatory
interconnection among all carriers of the Public Switched Telecom-
munications Network (hereinafter "PSTN"), guaranteeing intercon-
nection and interoperability among the carriers.
The 1981 breakup of AT&T allowed each of the RBOCs to re-
main a monopolist in its own region of the local telecommunica-
tions market. The logic of the breakup was that, given the
technology at that time, competition was economically feasible in
long distance telecommunications markets but not so in local tele-
communications markets. The Department of Justice deemed the
local telecommunications network to be too expensive to replicate,
considering the revenues that it could create, especially from resi-
dential and small business customers. Assuming at the time that
local telecommunications was a natural monopoly, the USDOJ al-
lowed the RBOCs to remain monopolists in their own respective
regions for local telecommunications.14
A key concern arose. Since long distance companies have to
pick up from and deliver calls to local telecommunications compa-
nies, there was a danger that, if an RBOC was allowed to also pro-
vide long distance service, that RBOC could leverage its monopoly
power in the local telecommunications market to foreclose its rivals
in long distance service. The RBOC would achieve this anti-com-
petitive action through the implementation of either a verticalprice
squeezestrategy or a raising rivals' costsstrategy, as explained below.
The consent decree that formalized the AT&T breakup, the Modifi-
cation of Final Judgment (hereinafter "MFJ"), protected the long
distance services market from these anti-competitive effects by
prohibiting the RBOCs from entering the long distance market.15
13. In the Matter of Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a Non-Domi-
nant Carrier, FCC No. 95-427 (October 12, 1995).
14. The author's conclusions regarding the logic of the breakup and the be-
lief that local telecommunications was a natural monopoly at the time are based on
private communication of the author with William Baxter, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for Antitrust and chief architect of the settlement that resulted in the 1981
breakup of AT&T. SeealsoNoll & Owen, supra note 10.
15. The MFJ discusses in detail the line-of-business restrictions imposed on
RBOCs:
The second type of restriction imposed upon the Operating Companies is said
to be intended to prevent them from engaging in any non-monopoly business
so as to eliminate the possibility that they might use their control over ex-
change services to gain an improper advantage over competitors in such busi-
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In summary, as part of the court decision implementing the
1981 breakup of AT&T, RBOCs were not allowed to enter the long
distance service market.16 This prohibition aimed to prevent
RBOCs from (i) leveraging their monopoly power in the local mar-
ket to implement a "vertical price squeeze" of long distance rivals
and (ii) raising long distance rivals' costsP I will first discuss verti-
cal leveraging in the context of the post-AT&T-breakup market
structure and the wisdom of the MFJ in imposing business restric-
tions on the RBOCs. I will then return to the vertical issues related
to the Trinko case. .
nesses. Thus, the Operating Companies would not be permitted (1) to
manufacture or market telecommunications products and customer premises
equipment; (2) to provide interexchange services, (3) to provide directory
advertising such as the Yellow Pages; (4) to provide information services; and
(5) to provide any other product or service is not a "natural monopoly service
actually regulated by tariff."
MFJ, supra note 8, at 143.
16. Id.
17. The MFJ notes that in the presence of line of business restrictions there
will be no incentive and ability for AT&T (or the RBOCs) to engage in the an-
ticompetitive conduct alleged:
As indicated in Part IV(A) supra, the ability of AT&T to engage in anticompe-
titive conc1uct stems largely from its control of the local Operating Compa-
nies. Absent such control, AT&T will not have the ability to disadvantage
competitors in the interexchange and equipment markets.
For example, with the divestiture of the Operating Companies AT&T will
not be able to discriminate against intercity competitors, either by subsidizing
its own intercity services with revenues from the monopoly local exchange
services, or by obstructing its competitors' access to the local exchange net-
work. The local Operating Companies will not be providing interexchange
services, and they will therefore have no incentive to discriminate. Moreover,
AT&T's competitors willbe guaranteed access that is equal to that provided to
AT&T, and intercity carriers therefore will no longer be presented with the
problems that confronted them in that area. SeePart VIII, infra.
Id. at 165.
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed:
First. AT&T will no longer have the opportunity to provide discriminatory
interconnection to competitors. The Operating Companies will own the local
exchange facilities. Si.nce these companies will not be providing inter-
exchange services, they will lack AT&T's incentive to discriminate. Moreover,
they will be required to provide all interexchange carriers with exchange ac-
cess that is "equal in type, quality, and price to that provided to AT&T and its
affiliates." Proposed Decree, Section II. SeePart VIII infra.
Id. at 171-72.
See also the discussion of the logic of the MFJ business restrictions at id., note 13.2005] VERTICAL LEVERAGEAND THE SACRIFICE PRINCIPLE 385
B. Mihatis a VerticalPriceSqueezeand How Doesit Lead to the
Fareclosure of Downstream Rivals by an Upstream Monopolist?
I begin by introducing the notion of a vertical price squeeze
through an example. Consider a phone call from New York City to
Boston under the MFJrestrictions. It is carried by a local telephone
company, formally known as a local exchange carrier (here Ver-
izon), within New York Cityup to the switch of a long distance com-
pany (which I will denote in Figure 1 by SNYc), say of AT&T. Then
the phone call is carried by the long distance company (here
AT&T) to its switch in Boston (denoted by SBO)and handed over to
the local exchange carrier (in this case, again Verizon) to be car-
ried to the terminating destination. The path of the phone call
from Verizon in NYCto AT&T to Verizon in Boston is shown in the
first line of Figure 1. In terms of pricing, Verizon charges AT&T an
"originating access fee" for transporting the call to AT&T's NYC
switch from the originating party. Verizon also charges AT&T a
"termination access fee" for transporting the call from AT&T's Bos-
ton switch to the terminating party. This is shown in line 2 of Fig-
ure 1. In the graphical representation" " stands for Verizon
while "1111111111" is for a long distance company, such as AT&T.
Figure 1: NYC to Boston Phone Call Under the MFJ
Business Line Restrictions
A =============== SN\'C====================== SBO ======;========== B
Origination access + long distance transmission + Termination access
Verizon
+ 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 +
] + [AT&T or other non-Verizon] + [ Verizon
Although to a final consumer the long distance call appears to
be and is sold as a single product, it is in fact composed of three
components-origination access, long distance transmission, and
termination access. Origination access, carrying the call from the
consumer's location to the local switch of a long distance company,
is provided in New York City byVerizon at price POACCESS. Termina-
tion access, carrying the call from the long distance switch in Bos-
ton to its destination, is provided in Boston by Verizon at price
PTACCESS' Thus, the retail price charged to the customer by AT&T
for the long distance call, PAB,is the sum of the prices for originat-
ing and terminating access that AT&T pays to Verizon plus the
AT&T price for long distance transmission, PLD.TRANSMISSION, i.e.:
PAB ==PO.ACCESS + PLD.TRANSMISSION + PTACCESS
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In a world without the MFJ business line restrictions that pre-
clude the RBOCs from operating in the long distance market, the
competitive situation would be dramatically different, as seen in
Figure 2. Now, besides the traditional long distance companies,
Verizon also carries long distance calls, and Verizon has the advan-
tage of providing origination and termination access to itself as well
as to its long distance competitors. The upper part of Figure 2
shows the long distance call carried by AT&T or any other non-
Verizon long distance carrier. The lower part of Figure 2 shows an
alternative way to carry the long distance call in the absence of MFJ
restrictions: the long distance call is carried all the way, both in its
long distance part and its local part, by Verizon.
Figure 2: NYC to Boston Phone Call Without the MFJ
Business Line Restrictions
A ================ SNYC===================== SBO =============== B
Origination access + long distance transmission + Termination access
Verizon
+ 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 +
] + [AT&T or other non-Verizon] + [ Verizon
+
Verizon ] + [ Verizon
+
] + [ Verizon
Verizon can now control the end-to-end price of the long dis-
tance call (PAB)as well as the prices of originating and terminating
access. Thus, a long distance company independent of Verizon
would now receive revenue for its long .distance transmission from
SNYCto SBO:
PAB- Po ACCESS - PTACCESS'
Notice that now the revenue of a pure long distance company
depends on three prices - PAB, POACCESS,and PTACCESS- which are
all under the control ofVerizon and can be manipulated so that the
per unit revenue that goes to an independent long distance carrier,
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PAB - PO.ACCESS - PT.ACCESS,18 can be "squeezed" to a very small
amount.19
Foreclosure of competitors can be achieved through a variety
of strategies. For example, the upstream monopolist can reduce
the price of retail service, PAB. However, this may be detrimental to
its short run profits and therefore under some conditions may be
undesirable. Alternatively, the upstream monopolist can increase
the price of access origination, PO.ACCESS, over which it has a monop-
oly. Any price PO.ACCESS above the monopolist's cost will place the
long distance rival at a profit disadvantage.2o If the final products
are undifferentiated, even the smallest deviation of the price of ac-
cess origination above its cost will result in the foreclosure of an
equally efficient long distance rival. That is because the access mo-
nopolist charges itself its own costs for access origination while it
charges the higher price to long distance rivals.
Thus, the monopolist in the access bottleneck, if allowed to
compete in the long distance service market, can leverage its mo-
nopoly power in the access bottleneck to foreclose rivals from that
market, even when the long distance market would have been com-
petitive absent this foreclosure.21 This potential anti-competitive
strategy highlights the wisdom of the MFJ business line restrictions
prohibiting the RBOCs from providing long distance service.
18. If there is head-on price competition and little or no product differentia-
tion among long distance carriers, Verizon controlsprice PAR, which is the same as
other carriers can charge for the same service. If there issignificant product differ-
entiation, there can be small differences in the prices that Verizon and a pure long
distance company can charge, but Verizon can still, through its own pricing, re-
duce the price PA8available to a pure long distance company.
19. Even when the prices for originating and terminating access are regulated
and even when they are not under the control ofVerizon, still the end-to-end price
of long distance is deregulated. Verizon can offer a low enough end-to-end long
distance price so that the difference PAR- POACCESS - PTACCESS is squeezed to a very
low amount, and thereby independent long distance companies are foreclosed.
20. In fact, access origination and termination have been traditionally set at
very high prices compared to cost with the regulatory objective of subsidizing basic
service. SeegenerallyNicholas Economides, TelecommunicationsRegulation:An Intro-
duction (NET Inst., Working Paper #04-02), availableat http://www.stern.nyu.edu/
networks/Telecommunications_Regulation.pdf (on file with the NYUAnnual Sur-
vey of American Law).
21. The general leveraging argument does not require that Verizon (or any
access monopolist) controls bothoriginating and terminating access; for the gen-
eral argument control of access on either side is sufficient. Since in long distance
telecommunications typically the originating party pays, it is generally accepted
that the vertical price squeeze will be much more likely when the originating ac-
'cess monopolist also provides long distance service.
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C. Foreclosure ThroughRaising Rivals' Costs
In the previous section we saw how an upstream monopolist
could use pricing to foreclose its rivals from a downstream market
when the downstream rivals require the use of the monopolized
input. I will now show that an upstream monopolist, if allowed in
the downstream market, can also foreclose its downstream rivals by
raising their costs, by reducing the quality of their product, or by
otherwise reducing their profitability through anti-competitive ac-
tions. Iwill show that, in the absence of the MFJrestrictions, even if
the regulated monopolist is forced to sell at cost, it will still be able
to foreclose its downstream competitors if it can raise its rivals'
costs.
Continuing the example of the previous section, suppose now
that Verizon is forced by regulators to sell access prices at cost.
Then Verizon cannot directly set a price for such services above cost
as discussed above. But Verizon can use raising rivals' costs strate-
gies against its long distance competitors, such as delays and quality
decreases, so that it increases the effective cost of access, VER-
lZONPRRCo.ACCESS, to an amount above its actual cost:22
VERiZONPRRCo.ACCESS> VERIZONCO.ACCESS.
Let the price of long distance transmission (that is, routing the
call from SNYC to SBO)to each company be AT&TPTRANSMISSION and VER-
lZO:-/PTRANSMISSION, and assume that the long distance rival is equally
efficient with Verizon:
AT&TPTRANSMISSION = VERIZONPTRANSMISSION.
Finally assume that the termination access price PT.ACCESS faced
by the two companies is the same.23 Then, faced with higher effec-
tive cost for access origination, equally efficient long distance rivals
will have to charge a higher price-AT&TP AB-for the final service
than Verizon, VERiZONP AB,and will therefore be foreclosed from the
long distance market:
AT&TPAB= VERiZONPRRCo.ACCESS+ AT&TPTRANSMISSION + PTACCESS =
VERIZONPRRCo.ACCESS+ VERiZONPTRANSMISSION + PT.ACCESS >




I 22. Price when opponent Raises Rivals' Costs (hereinafter "PRRC") repre-
sents the effective price of the monopolized input to a downstream rival when the
upstream monopolist uses a strategy that raises the costs of rivals or reduces their
quality. VERlZONPRRCo.ACCESS is the effective cost of access originauon faced by long
distance service rivals as a result of Verizon's raising rivals' costs actions.
23. The argument is strengthened if the RBOC is a monopolist in the termi-
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Therefore, when Verizon implements raising rivals' costs strate-
. gies, AT&T is forced to sell its long distance service above the price
at which Verizon sells it:
AT&TP AB > VERIZONP AB
Thus, in the absence of the business line restrictions imposed
by the MFJ, an RBOC monopolist in access origination could lever-
age its monopoly and foreclose its long distance rivals either
through the use of price strategies, such as setting the price of ac-
cess above cost, or though strategies that raise the costs of competi-
tors, reduce the quality of their product, or otherwise disadvantage
their profitability.
D. Summary of the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996
In the years following the AT&T breakup, RBOCs mounted a
very extensive lobbying effort in Congress to be allowed to provide
long distance service, thereby abandoning the restrictions of the
MFJ. The resulting law was the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
which allowed the RBOCs to offer long distance service under some
conditions, which are discussed in detail below, and, at the same
time, attempted to open the local telecommunications network to
competition. As I discuss below, the Telecommunications Act
failed miserably to create competition in local telecommunications.
Additionally, as a result of the poor implementation of the Act, ex-
isting competition in long distance is likely to diminish.24 .
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was a landmark reform
of the regulatory environment in telecommunications.25 Its main
objectives included (i) the creation of competition in local telecom-
munications and (ii) allowing entry of an RBOC in the long dis-
tance market once its local market had been opened to
competition. Despite this requirement, however, the Telecommu-
nications Act did not have an explicit means of establishing compet-
24. As explained in detail below, RBOCs were allowed to enter the long dis-
tance market in their own regions while retaining, in most cases, a near monopoly
position in residential and small business local telecommunications markets. As a
result, through implementation of a vertical price squeeze and raising rivals' costs
strategies by the RBOCs, AT&T announced in the summer of 2004 that it stopped
marketing both local and long distance services to residential customers, and MC!
followed a similar strategy, as was revealed in private communication between the
author and MC! executives. The two largest companies in long distance, AT&T
and MC!, were significantly weakened, and became takeover targets. At the time
of this writing, SBC has just acquired AT&T, and Verizon is expected to finish the
acquisition of MC! in January 2006. SeegenerallyEconomides, supra note 20.
25. For a deeper discussion of the benefits and costs of telecommunications
regulation, see generally Economides, supra note 20.
.
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itive conditions in local telecommunications markets, such as
entrants achieving a significant market share, before the RBOCs
could enter the long distance market.26 Thus, the Telecommunica-
tions Act did not adequately guard against RBOCs leveraging their
local telecommunications monopoly power in the long distance
market. 27
In 1996, the "last mile" of the telecommunications network
that is closest to the consumer, or the "local loop," remained a bot-
tleneck controlled by incumbent local exchange carriers (hereinaf-
ter "ILECs"), RBOCs, GTE, and smaller, typically rural independent
telecommunications companies. The Telecommunications Act
boldly attempted to introduce competition in this last bottleneck,
while also aiming to preserve the effective competition that had de-
veloped in the long distance market. 28
The basic logic behind the Telecommunications Act was to
break the network into components and let everyone compete in
every part, as well as in end-to-end services.29 To achieve this, the
Telecommunications Act mandated (i) interconnection;3o (ii) un-
bundling;31 and (iii) non-discrimination.32 Moreover, it took away
some of the incumbents' advantages that arise purely from histori-
cal reasons by (i) mandating that incumbents lease unbundled net-
work elements to entrants at cost-based prices;33 (ii) mandating
wholesale provision of any service presently provided by the
ILECs;34and (iii) imposing number portability.35 To preserve com-
petition in long distance, the Telecommunications Act attempted
to ensure that monopoly power in the local exchange was not ex-
ported to other markets.
Arguing that with the technology available at the time, entry in
local telecommunications was uneconomic, Congress defined ways
for entrants to share the existing local infrastructure monopolized
26. SeegeneraUyTelecommunications Act, 47 D.S.C. §§ 251-72.
27. For an extensive discussion of the Telecommunications Act, see
Economides, supra note 20; Nicholas Economides, U.S. TelecommunicationsToday,
in IS MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK (Carol V. Brown &Heikki Topi eds., Auerbach Pub-
lications 2003) availableat http://www.stem.nyu.edu/networks/DS2002.pdf.
28. SeegenerallyEconomides, supra note 20; Economides, supra note 27.
29. Economides, supra note 27.
30. Telecommunications Act, 47 D.S.C. §§ 251(a), (c)(2) (1996).
31. 47 D.S.C. §§ 251(c)(3), (c)(6).
32. 47 D.S.C. §§ 251(b)(I), (b) (3), (c)(2)(D), (c)(3), (c) (4) (b), 252(d)(I).
33. 47 D.S.C. § 251(c)(2).
34. 47 D.S.C. § 251(c)(4) (a).
35. 47 D.S.C. § 251(a) (2).2005] VERTICAL LEVERAGEAND THE SACRIFICE PRINCIPLE 391
by RBOCs and GTE.36 Entry in local telecommunications without
leasing or sharing the existing network was inherently more diffi-
cult than entry in the long distance market. Among the factors that
contributed to these difficulties were:
(i) High capital requirements-Building the "local loop" that
connected the customer to the network required much more
capital per customer than creating a long distance network.
(ii) Location-specific constraints-While many elements/com-
ponents of the long distance network were moveable, much
of the investment in the local exchange has to be made at
specific locations.37
To facilitate entry in local telecommunications markets, the
Act imposed mandatory interconnection among telecommunica-
tions networks, unbundled pricing, non-discrimination, and num-
ber portability. In particular, Section 251(c) (2) mandated
interconnection:
(A) for the transmission and routing of telephone exchange
service and exchange access;
(B) at any technically feasible point;
(C) that is at least equal in quality to that provided by the local
exchange carrier to itself or to any subsidiary, affiliate, or
any other party to which the carrier provides interconnec-
tion; and
(D) on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable,
and nondiscriminatory, in accordance with the terms and
36. The Federal Communications Commission put it as follows:
Because an incumbent LEC currently serves virtually all subscribers in its local
serving area, an incumbent LEC has little economic incentive to assist new
entrants in their efforts to secure a greater share of that market. An incum-
bent LEC also has the ability to act on its incentive to discourage entry and
robust competition by not interconnecting its network with the new entrant's
network or by insisting on supracompetitive prices or other unreasonable con-
ditions for terminating calls from the entrant's customers to the incumbent
LEC's subscribers.
Congress addressed these problems in the 1996 Act by mandating that
the most significant economic impediments to efficient entry into the monop-
olized local market must be removed. The incumbent LECs have economies
of density, connectivity, and scale; traditionally, these have been viewed as cre-
ating a natural monopoly. Aswe pointed out in our NPRM, the local competi-
tion provisions of the Act require that these economies be shared with
entrants.
Federal Communications Commission, First Report and Order, FCC No. 96-325, at , 10-11 (August 1, 1996).
37. SeegenerallyEconomides, supra note 20; Economides, supra note 27.392 NYU ANNUAL SURVEYOF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 61:379
conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this
section and section 252.38
Section 251 (c) (3) mandated unbundled pricing, that is, offer-
ing for sale network elements at "rates, terms, and conditions that
are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory."39 To implement in-
terconnection and unbundling, an incumbent was required to al-
low for physical collocation of equipment at its premises.4O
Moreover, all companies had the duty to provide number portabil-
ity, so that consumers could keep their phone numbers if they
changed their local service provider. 41
The Act introduced two novel ways of entry, besides entry
through the installation of new facilities.42 The first way allowed
entry in the retailing part of the telecommunications business by
requiring ILECs to sell, at wholesale prices to entrants, any retail
service that they offered. Such entry was essentially limited to the
retailing part of the market.43
The second and most significant novel way of entry introduced
by the Act was through the leasing of UNEs from incumbents. In
particular, the Act requires that ILECs (i) unbundle their net-
works;44and (ii) that they offer for lease to entrants network com-
ponents (unbundled network elements, "UNEs") "at cost plus
reasonable profit."45 Thus, the Act envisioned the telecommunica-














38. Telecommunications Act, 47 V.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (1996).
39. 47 V.S.C. § 251(c)(3).
40. 47 V.S.C. § 251(c)(6).
41. 47 V.S.C. § 251(b)(2).
42. SeeFederal Communications Commission, First Report and Order, FCC
No. 96-325, at ~ 12 (August 1, 1996).
43. The Act states that prices for resold wholesale services will be set as fol-
lows: "a State commission shall determine wholesale rates on the basis of retail
rates charged to subscribers for the telecommunications service requested, exclud-
ing the portion thereof attributable to any marketing, billing, collection, and other
costs that will be avoided by the local exchange carrier." 47 V.S.C. § 252(d) (3).
Notice that, even if all avoided costs are appropriately identified and deducted
from final prices, the ILEC is still able to collect the pre-entry retail profit from
resold wholesale services.
44. 47 V.S.C. §§ 251(c)(3), (c)(6).
45. The FCC and State Regulatory Commissions have interpreted these words
to mean Total Element Long Run Incre'mental Cost which is the fo.rward looking,
long run, minimized economic cost of an unbundled element and includes the
competitive return on capital. SeeFederal Communications Commission, First Re-
port and Order, FCC No. 96-325, at § VII (August 1, 1996). '.2005] VERTICAL LEVERAGEAND THE SACRIFICE PRINCIPLE 393
works. The Federal Communications Commission defined the key
UNEs as the "local loop," local switching, and local transport.46
Entry through leasing of UNEs would be uneconomical unless
prices for the leased elements were set at appropriate prices that
imitated competitive prices. The Act ordered that pricing of inter-
connection or unbundled network elements:
(A) shall be
(i) based on the cost (determined without reference to a
rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding) of pro-
viding the interconnection or network. element
(whichever is applicable), and
(ii) nondiscriminatory, and
(B) may include a reasonable profit.47
The appropriate pricing of leased UNEs, transport, and access
termination was crucially important for promoting effective compe-
tition. The extent to and the speed with which competition would
develop depended critically on having prices for UNEs and services
that were as close to efficient economic costs as possible. The more
prices exceeded efficient economic costs, the less entry there would
be. The less entry there was, the less likely it would be that effective
competition would develop in local exchange markets, and, if effec-
tive competition did develop, it would happen more slowly.
In implementing the Telecommunications Act, the FCC
adopted the long-run, forward-looking economic cost as the mea-
sure of appropriate costs, or Total Element Long Run Incremental
Costs (hereinafter "TELRIC").48 This cost measure fulfilled both
the requirement of the Telecommunications Act that the rates for
UNEs be nondiscriminatory, and the need for that requirement to
apply not only to the rates charged to different entrants, but also
between the entrants and the incumbent.49
TELRIC is the sum of the costs for all economically efficient
inputs required to supply the UNE.50 TELRIC has the following
features: (1) it is a forward-looking economic cost; (2) it is the low-
est cost to provide the service; (3) it is a long-run cost; (4) it is an
incremental cost; (5) it includes a competitive return on capital; (6)
it excludes monopoly rents; (7) it excludes cross subsidies of any
46. Seeid. at § 51.319 (August 1, 1996).
47. 47 V.S.C. § 252(d)(1).
48. SeeFederal Communications Commission, First Report and Order, FCC
No. 96-325, at § VII (August 1, 1996).
49. [d. SeealsoEconomides, supra note 20; Economides supra note 27.
50. Federal Communications Commission, First Report and Order, FCC No.
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kind; and (8) in general, it reflects cost differences among geo-
graphic regions.51 .
Using TELRIC as the basis for prices performs several func-
tions, which, in combination, guarantee economic efficiency. First,
it gives the right signal to consumers making purchasing decisions
among goods, because these decisions are made on the basis of
what society must give up to supply these goods. In other words, it
achieves allocative efficiency. Second, such a price directs produc-
tion to the most efficient, lowest-cost suppliers, because these pro-
ducers can offer the lowest prices. In other words, it achieves
productive efficiency. Third, it gives the appropriate signal to firms
making decisions of investment, entry, and exit, which are made
purely on the basis of forward-looking costs. In other words, it
achieves dynamic efficiency.52
Prices based on TELRIC plus reasonable profit, as mandated
by the Act, for the leasing of UNEs are clearly above the present
cost of the local telecommunications network.53 The present cost
of the local telecommunications network reflects the cost of pre-
sent-day resources that would be necessary to construct such a net-
work.54 Thus, from an economic point of view it is the appropriate
cost measure, and it was correctly adopted by the FCC.55 The in-
cumbent local exchange carriers had argued that the appropriate
cost measure would be the historic or "embedded" cost of the net-
work-that is, the cost of the network whenever it was con-
structed.56 However, the historic construction cost of the network
does not generally correspond to the cost of the present day re-
sources needed to construct such a network,57 There could be
many reasons for this phenomenon; I highlight two that show how
inappropriate it would be to use -historic costs, especially ih the case
of local telecommunications.
51. ld.
52. SeegenerallyEconomides, supra note 20; Economides supra note 27.
53. SeeFederal Communications Commission, First Report and Order, FCC
No. 96-325, at §VII (August 1, 1996).
54. Seeid. at § F 51.505.
55. ld. The FCC did not calculate the cost of the most efficient current net-
work. Instead it allowed for the locations of switches and central offices of the
incumbents to be fixed and calculated the cost of creating a present-day network
given these locations. Since these locations could also be optimized in the most
efficient network, the cost of the network as calculated by the FCC was higher than
that of the most efficient network. Because it kept the old locations of switches
and central offices fixed, the network design approvea by the FCC was called a
"scorched node" network design.
56. Seeid.
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First, technological change implies very significant cost reduc-
tions in the provision of telecommunications services. 58 For exam-
ple, a key function in telecommunications is switching and routing
calls appropriately. Since the 1950s, computers have performed
this function and technological progress has been immense. To say
that the appropriate cost today of a present day PC is billions of
dollars because producing a computer with the corresponding
computing power wou~d cost that much in 1955 or 1960 is totally
absurd. The incumbents' proposal of using historic costs in the
face of fast technological chapge is equally absurd.
Second, telecommunications companies were regulated for a
significant period according to "rate of return regulation." Very
briefly that meant that a company's profits could not exceed a "cap-
ital base" multiplied by a "rate of return," and that the company was
therefore guaranteed to recover its network infrastructure invest-
ments.59 The regulator set the rate of return and the company ad-
justed its capital base and prices so that its profil:$ would not exceed
the capital base times the rate of return.60 An expansion of the
capital base by a dollar allows the company to increase its allowed
profits. Since this regulation guarantees recovery of investment
and allows for expansion of profits when the capital base is in-
creased, it is clear that a company has an incentive to keep its ~api-
tal base high.61 Thus, the incumbent local exchange carriers have
historically kept their capital base high, and the key element of this
capital base is the local network infrastructure.62 Therefore, even if
historical costs were the appropriate measure of costs (which they
are not) the historical costs of the incumbents would have to be
adjusted downward significantly because of the distortions caused
by the rate of return regulation.63
The Telecommunications Act allowed for the entry of RBOCs
into the long distance market after they opened their local ex-
58. SeegenerallyEconomides, supra note 20; Economides, supra note 27.
59. SeeHaxveyAverch & Leland L.Johnson, Behaviorof theFirm UnderRegula-
toryConstraint, 52AM.ECON. REv.1052,1053-69 (1962);Noll&Owen,supranote
10.
60. Averch &Johnson, supra note 59.
61. Seeid. at 1053-69 (discussing these and additional distortions created by
rate of return regulation).
62. AT&T long distance repeatedly adjusted its book value downward after
competition developed in the long distance market to eliminate the distortion
caused by the rate of return regulation. The RBOCs and GTE have not done so.
63. Moreover, it is likely that incumbent local exchange carriers have already
recovered the original cost of the vast majority of the physical plant that was in.
place \>y1996.
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change network to competition.64 Thus, from the point of view of
an RBOC, long distance entry was supposed to be the reward for
allowing competition in the local exchange and forfeiting a local
exchange monopoly. The Telecommunications Act was based on
the belief that the individual private incentives of the RBOCs would
be sufficient to drive the process. Thus, the Telecommunications
Act did not impose penalties for delay or non-compliance. This has
proved to be a very serious deficiency.65 Congress thought that the
"carrot" of entry into the long distance market would be a sufficient
incentive to compel RBOCs to open their local networks. Events
have revealed that Congress erred in this assumption; RBOCs' be-
havior has shown that they preferred not to open their local net-
work and instead to pay the price of staying out of long distance for
a while.
In summary, among other requirements, the Telecommunica-
tions Act:
(i) affirmed the mandatory interconnection of telecommunica-
tions networks that comprised the Public Switched Telecom-
munications Network;
(ii) required unbundling of each local telecom network and its
pricing;
(iii) imposed the obligation on RBOCs to lease at cost plus rea-
sonable profit the unbundled parts of the local telecommuni-
cations network, called UNEs, to any entrant;66
(iv) imposed the obligation on RBOCs to provide to entrants at a
wholesale discount any service it provides to the public;
(v) imposed other duties on RBOCs, such as non-discrimination,
number portability, and co-location of equipment,. so that
RBOCs would not leverage their monopoly power in the local
telecommunications network;
(vi). allowed each RBOC to enter in the long distance service mar-
ket in its service area (where it used to have a legal monop-
01y)67once the RBOC unbundled the local network, met
non-discriminatory and other requirements, and showed that
its entry in long distance was "in the public interest."
64. Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 271 (1996).
65. SeegenerallyEconomides, supra note 20; Economides supra note 27.
66. In broad categories, the UNEs were (i) the "local loop" the connects the
customer premises with the local switch; (ii) local switching services; and (Hi) local
transport seIVices.
67. The Act also allowed immediate RBOC entry in long distance in locations
that were ~ot in its service area. See47 U.S.C. §§ 271-72.
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E. Implementation of the Telecommunications Act
There were very significant delays in the implementation of the
Act and a number of legal challenges. There were long delays in
the implementation of electronic systems that could easily and at
low cost switch large numbers of customer accounts to entrants, as
is regularly done for long distance service. There were also signifi-
cant complaints that incumbent monopolists in the local market
were raising the costs of their rivals or lowering their rivals' quality.
Allegations included temporarily disconnecting customers who had
switched their local telecommunications service provider, and even
foreclosing these customersaltogether.68
By 2004, RBOCs were cleared in all states by the FCC to enter
the long distance service market, and this had occurred before local
entrants had acquired significant market shares in most areas that
would noticeably challenge the monopolistic or dominant position
of the incumbent local exchange carriers (RBOCs and GTE in their
present, after-mergers combinations). 69
By2003 to 2004, local exchange carriers offered bundles of lo-
cal and long distance services in many areas. In most states, RBOCs
were allowed to sell "buckets" of local and long distance minutes,
where the customer could use any minute in the bucket either as a
local or as a long distance minute. Because the origination and
termination access prices significantly exceeded tJ;1eircosts, the in-
troduction of interchangeable buckets of local and long distance
minutes created additional disadvantages for companies that partic-
ipated only in the long distance transmission of calls. The local
exchange carrier would charge itself for the cost of originating and
terminating access, but it would charge independent long distance
companies significantly higher prices for originating and terminat-
68. See,e.g.,the California Public Utilities Commission investigation proceed-
ings in MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Pac. Bell, No. 96-12-026 (Cal. P.U.C. Sept. 24,
1997); Cal. P.U.C. Decision 01-05-087 (May24,2001); and Landmark Cases, http:/
/ www.blechercollins.com/CM/LandmarkCases/LandmarkCases32.asp (discussing
Caltech Int'l Telecom Corp. v. Pac. Bell, No. 97-2105 (N.D. Cal. 2000)). Also, the
Trinko case was based on factS that emerged from an earlier investigation of
NYNEX's (Verizon's predecessor's) violations of itS interconnection agreement
with AT&T by the New York Public Service Commission. NYNEXpaid $10 million
to AT&T and other competitors for losses arising from violations of itS intercon-
nection agreement. SeeVerizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 402-05 (2004). .
69. By 2004, Bell Atlantic, NYNEX and GTE have been combined to form
Verizon, SBC has absorbed Ameritech, Pacific Bell, and SNET (Southern New En-
gland Telephone), US West has been bought by Quest, and Bell South remains the
only RBOG which has not merged since 1981.
~
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ing access. Thus, the iridependent long distance companies w:ould
face higher costs and were directly subject to a vertical price
squeeze. The main hope for competition remained the possibility
that extensive entry into local markets (including the markets for
originating and terminating access) would significantly erode the
mo~opoly or dominant position of the incumbent local exchange
carners.
There was a tremendous amount of litigation in the implemen-
tation of the 1996 Act. Besides the litigation resulting from imple-
mentation in each state, the RBOCs and GTE challenged the FCC
rules. The Supreme Court invalidated the first set of FCC rules in
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board.7O The Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit invalidated much of the second set of FCC rules in
United States Telecom Ass'n v. Federal Communications Commission.71
The FCC consolidated the remand with its second triennial review
of the rules implementing the Act.72
Much of the subsequent litigation focused on the issue of "im-
pairment," as described in Section 251(d)(2)(B) of the Act. Sec-
tion 251(d) (2) reads:
(2) In determining what network elements should be made
available for purposes of subsection (c)(3), the Commis-
sion shall consider, at a minimum, whether
(A) access to such network elements as are proprietary in
nature is necessary; and
(B) the failure to provide access to such network elements
would impair the ability of the telecommunications
carrier seeking access to provide the services that it
seeks to offer. 73
Mter losing the first appeal, the FCC defined impairment as
follows: an entrant competitive local exchange carrier (hereinafter
"CLEC") would "be impaired when lack of access to an incumbent
[local exchange carrier] network element poses a barrier or barri-
ers to entry, including operational and economic barriers, that are
likely to make entry into a market uneconomic."74 In the appeal of
the second triennial review of the FCC, referred to generally as the
USTA II decision, the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC's findings
70. 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
71. 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
72. SeeReport and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incum-
bent Local Exchange Carriers, FCC No. 03-36 (Feb. 20, 2003) [hereinafter TROJ.
73. Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 251(d) (2) (1996).
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that entrants would be impaired nationwide with respect to mass
market switching.75 As a result of this decision and the FCC's subse-
quent order on remand,76 RBOCs do not have to set up new leases
of the "local switching" UNE at prices that reflect cost plus reasona-
ble profit. As an immediate consequence of USTA II, in the sum-
mer of 2004, AT&T, the largest long distance carrier, stopped
marketing both local and long distance service to residential cus-
tomer~. SBCacquired AT&T in November 2005, and Verizon is ex-
pected to finish the acquisition of MCI in January 2006. As a result
of these acquisitions, there will be a significant reduction in the
number and capabilities ofindependent long distance competitors,
resulting in likely price increases in long distance service.
In summary, the Telecommunications Act failed miserably in
two of its main objectives. First, it failed to create competition in
local telecommunications. Second, the Telecommunications Act
was supposed to guard against RBOCs leveraging their monopoly
power in local telecommunications service to the long distance
market. It compktely failed in this too. The failure of the Act was
mainly in its implementation. The Act did not impose punishments
and penalties for delays in implementation; it harbored the seeds of
its own destruction. The Act assumed that the RBOCs, following
their own incentives, would allow competition in local telecommu-
nications to flourish so that they would have guaranteed entry into
the long distance market. But since there were no specific
benchmarks on the degree of necessary competition before an
RBOC could enter the long distance market, the RBOCs calculated
correctly that they could enter long distance service even when
competition in the local service market was minimal, and, in fact,
the RBOCs entered long distance in all states without significant
competition in local service. Thus, the failure of the Telecommuni-
cations Act was to a significant extent the result of insufficient atten-
tion to the vertical leveraging that a monopolist or near-monopolist
RBOC could exert on entrants that needed to lease parts of the
RBOC local telecommunications network to produce and sell local
telephone servic~s.
As I will show below, a monopolist RBOC can leverage its mo-
nopoly power in the local telecommunications network to foreclose
rivals and potential rivals in local telecommunications service who
75. See United States Telecom Ass'n v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
359 F.3d 554, 594-95 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
76. Order on Remand, In the Matter of Unbundled Access to Network Ele-
ments, Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local
Exchange ,Carriers, FCC No. 04-290 (Dec. 15,2004).400 NYU ANNUAL SURVEYOF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 61:379
need to lease the monopolist's network to compete. This issue of
monopoly leveraging was well understood at the time of the
breakup of AT&T in 1981, whereby RBOCs were granted monopo-
lies in local telecommunications markets while competition devel-
oped and intensified in long distance. As part of the court decision
implementing the breakup of AT&T, RBOCs were not allowed to
enter the long distance service market. As I have explained, this
prohibition was created to prevent RBOCs from (i) leveraging their
monopoly power in the local market and implementing a "vertical
price squeeze" on long distance rivals; and (ii) raising (long dis-
tance) rivals' costs.
We will return to the vertical issues related to the Trinko case
after summarizing the Supreme Court decision on Trinko.
III.
SUMMARYOF THE SUPREME COURT
DECISION IN TRINKO
The Law Offices of Curtis V.Trinko was a local telecommuni-
cations service customer of AT&T that sued Verizon, alleging that
Verizon was implementing an anti-competitive scheme against
AT&T and other local competitors so that Verizon could preserve
its monopoly in local telecommunications service.77The allegations
included discrimination in fulfilling customer transfer orders to en-
trants. The district court dismissed all claims and accepted the view
of the defendants that a breach of the interconnection agreement
between Verizon and AT&T should be remedied through an ad-
ministrative process; antitrust litigation would only disrupt the regu-
latory process of implementation of the Telecommunications Act.78
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
dismissal of Trinko's antitrust claim.79 It noted that "it is unlikely
that allowing antitrust suits would substantially disrupt the regula-
tory proceedings mandated by the Telecommunications Act."8O
Moreover, the Second Circuit stated, "while ideally, the regulatory
process alone would be enough to bring competition to the local
phone service markets, it is possible that the antitrust laws will be
77. Trinko sued NYNEX,which Bell Atlantic eventually absorbed. Bell Atlan-
tic merged with GTE to create Verizon. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Of-
fices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,402-05 (2004).
. 78. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko.v. Bell Atl. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 738, 745
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), rev'd, 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002), rev'd, 540 U.S. 98 (2004).
79. LawOffices of Curtis V. Trinko v.Bell At!. Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 113 (2d Cir.
2002), rev'd, 540 U.S. 98 (2004).
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needed to supplement the regulatory scheme, especially with re-
spect to injury caused to consumers."81 Allowing Trinko's antitrust
claim to continue, the Second Circuit held that Verizon's failure to
lease parts of its local network to rivals according to the rules of the
Telecommunicatibns Act could result in monopolization once all
facts are taken into consideration.82
.The Supreme Court's Trinko decision is organized in four
parts. Part I describes the complaint and procedural history of the
case.83 Part II considers "what effect (if any) the 1996 Act has upon
the application of traditional antitrust principles,"84 and concludes
that "the 1996 Act preserves claims that satisfy existing antitrust
standards [but] does not create new claims that go beyond existing
antitrust standards."85 Part III held that "Verizon's alleged insuffi-
cient assistance in the provision of service to rivals is not a recog-
nized antitrust claim under [the Supreme] Court's existing refusal-
to-deal precedents."86 Part IV considers whether to extend the
Court's existing refusal-to-deal precedents to recognize a § 2 claim
for failure to comply with the requirements of the 1996 Act, and
concludes that such an extension is unwarranted given the existing
regulatory structure designed to enforce the requirements of the
1996 Act.87
In particular, the Supreme Court held and reasoned as follows:
Although the Telecommunications Act of 1996 has an anti-
trust "savings clause," it does not create a different environ-
ment than the customary one in the application of antitrust
law.8s
(ii) As is well established in antitrust tradition, monopoly by itself
is not illegal, and liability requires anti-competitive conduct.89
(i)
81. Id. at 112.
82. Id. at 113.
83. Trinka, 540 U.S. at 402-05.
84. Id. at 405.
85. Id. at 407.
86. Id. at 410.
87. Id. at 411-16.
88. Id. at 405-07.
89. Specifically the Supreme Court notes:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the
free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for
a short period-is what attracts "business acumen" in the first place; it induces
risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the
incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found
unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.
Id. at 407.
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(iii) Antitrust law only rarely requires cooperation of a monopolist
with rivals because:
(a) it can lead to collusion;9°
(b) may retard innovation; and91
(c) may reduce investment.92
(iv) In Trinko, unlike in Aspen Skiing, the monopolist Verizon did
not voluntarily sell the product (here leased UNEs) and then
stop selling it or discriminate against rivals. Instead the mar-
ket for leased UNEs in Trinko was created by regulatory fiat.
Aspen Skiing wasalready "at or near the outer boundary of § 2
liability."93
(v) The "Essential Facilities" doctrine has no application in
Trinko and there is "no need to either recognize [the essen-
tial facilities doctrine] or .to repudiate it here."94
(vi) The Court should not get involved in the details of regulatory
matters.95
IV.
ISSUES AND PROBLEMS ARISING FROM
THE TRINKO DECISION
There are several aspects of this decision about which I am
troubled as an economist. First, the Court appears concerned that
compelling negotiation between competitors could lead to collu-
sion: "Moreover, compelling negotiation between competitors may
facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: collusion."96 However, in
the case of negotiation between an incumbent monopolist local ex-
change carrier (here Verizon) and an entrant (here AT&T) there is
no possibility of collusion because only the incumbent has the re-
source (the local exchange network) over which there is negotia-
tion while the entrant(s) has no such network. Thus, there is no
90. "Moreover, compelling negotiation between competitors may facilitate
the supreme evil of antitrust: collusion." Id. at 408.
91. This is implied by allowing monopoly power and monopoly prices to pro-
vide incentives to innovate: "To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession
of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an
element of anticompetitive conduct." Id. at 407.
92. 'Judicial oversight under the Sherman Act would seem destined to distort
investment and lead to a new layer of interminable litigation, atop the variety of
litigation routes already available to and actively pursued by competitive LECs." Id.
at 414.
93. Id. at 409.
94. Id. at 411.
95. Id. at 411-15.
96. I~. at 408.
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possibility of negotiation leading to a collusive arrangement among
sellers of substitutes. Here the relationship between the incumbent
and an entrant is purely a relationship between a buyer and a seller,
in which negotiation is standard practice and does not typically
raise antitrust concerns.97 Moreover, the Telecommunications Act
imposes the obligation on the parties to negotiate,98 and if the Su-
preme Court really believed that such negotiations raised antitrust
concerns, it should have pointed to other problems, such as the
Act's explicit requirement that carriers negotiate. Thus, the
Court's concern over compelling negotiation is misguided.
Second, the Court is concerned that the leasing requirement
imposed by regulation may reduce investment.99 To the extent that
antitrust law is useful in increasing the social benefits from the exis-
tence and operation of markets, it should be pointed out that in-
creasing social benefits from markets does not necessarily imply
that investment should be maximized. In fact, often, markets and
trade help reduce investment to the benefit of society. In the case
of local telecommunications, it was well understood by Congress in
passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that the cost of repli-
cating local networks would be prohibitive. The point of the Tele-
communications Act was to create competition without duplicating
local networks. That is, Congress explicitly and with full considera-
tion of the facts chose a regulatory framework that reduced invest-














97. The Federal Communications Commission noted:
Congress recognized that, because of the incumbent LEC's incentives and su-
perior bargaining power, its negotiations with new entrants over the terms of
such agreements would be quite different from typical commercial negotia-
tions. As distinct from bilateral commercial negotiation, the new entrant
comes to the table with little or nothing the incumbent LEC needs or wants.
See FederalCommunications Commission, First Report and Order, FCC No. 96-
325, at ~ 15 (August I, 1996).
98. Section 251 (c) of the Telecommunications Act reads:
(c) ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF INCUMBENT LOCAL EXCHANGE
CARRIERS-In addition to the duties contained in subsection (b), each incum-
bent local exchange carrier has the following duties:
(1) DUTI TO NEGOTlATE- The duty to negotiate in good faith In ac-
cordance with section 252 the particular terms and conditions of agree-
ments to fulfill the duties described in paragraphs (I) through (5) of
subsection (b) and this subsection. The requesting telecommunications
carrier also has the duty to negotiate in good faith the terms and condi-
tions of such agreements.
Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 25I(c) (1996).
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same time increased competition. 1°° In requiring incumbent loca!
exchange carriers to lease local networks at cost plus reasonable
profit, Congress decided that replication of local networks was eco-
nomically inefficient and chose regulatory rules that would tend to
reduce investment in replication of the incumbent's local network
facilities. Nevertheless, less investment in replicating incumbent's
facilities does not necessarily imply less investment overall in local
telecommunications, since the rules apply only to the legacy net-
works, and not to new investments.
Third, the Court is concerned about the fact that the market
for leasing UNEs was created by regulatory fiat and did not exist
voluntarily, so sharing ofUNEs was "forced sharing." In the Court's
thinking this justifies Verizon's abuses because the price was "cost-
based" and not "market-based." The decision specifically notes:
"Verizon's reluctance to interconnect at the cost-based rate of com-
pensation available under §251 (c) (3) tells us nothing about dreams
of monopoly."lOl The Court notes the difference between Trinko
and Aspen Skiing, where the defendant refused to sell at duopoly
prices to a competitor.102 But Verizon was already a monopolist i:t;l
both the network services and retail services markets; Verizon did
not need to "dream of monopoly" since it already had a monopoly
in both markets.1°3 The crucial issue for Verizon as it related to
Trinko, was how the monopolies in both markets would be main-
tained. I have outlined above how the practices that raised rivals'
costs and otherwise disadvantaged rivals helped Verizon maintain
its monopoly.
More generally, I am concerned that here the Court erred in
understanding how markets are defined and work. A market is de-
fined by demand for a product or service. Refusal to deal should
not be deemed anti-competitive only if it is a refusal to sell at prices
significantly above cost, such as monopoly or duopoly prices. As
long as the refusal to deal occurs at above-average-cost prices (and
lease prices for UNEs were guaranteed to be above cost since they
were set by regulation at costplus reasonable profit), the company en-
gaging in such practices should be found liable since it is clear that
100. For example, the rules of the 1996 Act require incumbents to provide
unbundled network elements at rates that will "attract new entrants when it would
be more efficient to lease than to build or resell." Verizon Communications, Ine.
v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 535 U.S. 623 (2002).
101. Trinka, 540 U.S. at 409.
102. 1d. at 408-10.
103. See Nicholas Economides, Kaga Seim & V. Brian Viard, QuantifYing the
Benefitsof Entry into Local Phone Service (manuscript on file with the NYU Annual
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if it sold the products or services the company would have collected
sufficient revenue to cover its costs. Clearly the Court should have
judged Verizon's refusal to sell at above-average-cost prices as anti-
competitive.
In Aspen Skiing Co.v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,Aspen Skiing
controlled three out of four skiing slopes in Aspen, Colorado with
the fourth slope controlled by Aspen Highlands. Aspen Skiing pre-
viously offered a joint ticket with its competitor, Aspen Highlands,
so that a buyer would be able to ski on all four slopes with revenue
shared according to use. In 1978-79 Aspen Skiing discontinued
the joint ticket and refused to sell its tickets to Aspen Highlands
even at full price, in order to prevent Aspen Highlands from bun-
dling them with its own tickets to recreate the joint ticket that had
formerly been available. The Supreme Court affirmed that Aspen
Skiing's actions were anti-competitive.104 The Court noted:
The refusal to accept the Adventure Pack coupons in exchange
for daily tickets was apparently motivated entirely by a decision
to avoid providing any benefit to Highlands even though ac-
cepting the coupons would have entailed no cost to [Aspen
Skiing Co.] itself, would have provided it with immediate bene-
fits, and would have satisfied its potential customers. Thus the
evidence supports an inference that [Aspen Skiing Co.] was
not motivated by efficiency concerns and that it was willing to
sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in ex-
change for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival.105
Comparing the Aspen Skiing facts to those of Trinko, one can
expect that a company (i.e., Verizon) would be more likely to re-
fuse to sell at lower but still above cost prices than at higher prices
since that company's revenue would be lower at lower prices. That
is, from the point of view of the company committing the anti-com-
petitive act, the incentive to refuse to sell to competitors was higher
in Trinko than in Aspen (assuming that margins in Trinko are lower)
and therefore, everything else being equal, refusal to deal was more
likely to occur in Trinko than in Aspen. If the refusal to deal of the
duopolist in Aspen Skiing was anti-competitive, the refusal to deal by
the monopolist in Trinko should have been even more damning.
104. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
593-608 (1985).
105. "The 'Adventure Pack,' which consisted of a 3-daypass at Highlands and
three vouchers, each equal to the price of a daily lift ticket at a Ski Co. mountain.
The vouchers were guaranteed by funds on deposit in an Aspen bank, and were
redeemed by Aspen merchants at full value." Id. at 594.
_.
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Fourth, when the price isset by regulation below the monopoly
price, a monopolist has an incentive to discriminate against rivals
by: raising rival's costs;106reducing the quality of the input it sells to
rivals; or otherwise impeding access to its product.107 In the ab-
sence of regulation, a monopolist has the opportunity to charge a
high price and to discriminate in price against its competitors or
potential competitors. In the presence of regulations, such as those
imposed by the Telecommunications Act that reduce the price the
monopolist could charge below the monopoly price but not below
average cost and that require no price discrimination, the monopo-
list has an incentive to resort to raising rivals' costs strategies so that
rivals are disadvantaged. Such strategies increase the cost to rivals
and reduce the competition and social welfare that arise from the
existence and competitive operation of a market.108 Additionally,
sometimes raising rivals' costs may impose a cost on the monopolist
who is implementing the increases. But the monopolist is willing to
bear these costs because of the impact these strategies have in rais-
ing prices and foreclosing competition. Although raising rivals'
costs strategies are not optimal from the point of view of the mo-
nopolist in the presence of unregulated competition, their use can
be desirable in the presence of a regulatory environment that pre-
vents the monopolist from setting the monopoly price and restricts
price discrimination.l09 The Court missed this point completely by
basing its thinking on Aspen Skiing as an exception, disregarding the
fact that there were no regulatory restrictions, and therefore no sig-
nificant incentives to employ raising rivals' costs strategies.110
Fifth, although the reluctance of the Court to get involved in
the details of regulatory matters is understandable, that reluctance
is misplaced here. For example, the Court could have declared that
the degradation of Verizon's service to AT&T was a monopolistic
practice and evaluated its antitrust implications without getting into
the details of the regulatory process. As the Second Circuit ob-
106. SeegenerallySteven C. Salop & David T. SchefIman, Raising Rivals' Cost,
73 AM.ECON.REv.267 (1983).
107. SeeNicholas Economides, The Incentivefor Non-PriceDiscrimination by an
Input Monopolist, 16 1NT'Lj. INDUS.ORG.271 (1998).
108. SeegenerallyThomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Coststo AchievePowerOverPrice,96 YALE LJ. 209 (1986);
Economides,supranote 107. ..
109. SeegenerallyKrattenmaker & Salop, supra note 108; Economides, supra
note 107.
110. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, 540 U.S.
398,409 (2001,1:).r
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served, there is a wayfor the antitrust and regulatory setups to work
in parallel.1I I
Sixth, there is an important vertical leveraging issue in Trinko
that I discuss in the next section.
V.
VERTICAL LEVERAGE IN TRINKO;
RAISING RIVALS' COSTS
A. Foreclosure Through a VerticalPriceSqueeze
Verizon provided and continues to provide two products/ser-
vices: (i) network infrastructure services (hereinafter "NET ser-
vices") to itself and to entrants in local telecommunications, such as
AT&T; and (ii) end-user telephone services (hereinafter "retailing
services"). At the time of the allegation, Verizon had a monopoly
position in both.1l2 The key actions of Verizon in the events lead-
ing to Trinko can be seen as the result ofVerizon leveraging its mo-
nopoly in NET services to preserve its monopoly in retail services.
This issue was clearly recognized by the Second Circuit, which
noted that Trinko "may have a monopoly leveraging claim," based
on the fact that "the defendant '(1) possessed monopoly power in
one market; (2) used that power to gain a competitive advantage
. . . in another distinct market; and (3) caused injury by such an-
ticompetitive conduct.' "113The Supreme Court dismissed the verti-
cal issue using a fallacious circular argument in footnote four of its
decision, stating, "In any event, leveraging presupposes anticompe-
titive conduct, which in this case could only be the refusal-to-deal
claim we have rejected."1l4 That is, the Court dismissed the vertical
leveraging claim based on the fact that it had dismissed the hori-
zontal claim, as if the vertical claim could not stand on its own. But
the vertical leveraging claim did not require a finding of liability on
111. "While ideally, the regulatory process alone would be enough to bring
competition to the local phone service markets, it ispossible that the antitrust laws
will be needed to supplement the regulatory scheme, especially with respect to
injury caused to consumers.» Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko v. BellAt!. Corp., 305
F.3d 89, 112 (2d Cir. 2002), rev'd, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
112. SeeEconomides, Seim & Viard, supra note 103. SeealsoINDUSTRY ANALY-
SIS DIVISION, COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
TRENDS INTELEPHONE SERVICE (March 2000) (indicating in Table 9.4 that the mar-
ket share of entrants using UNEs in New York State was 0.4% in 1997, 0.4% in
1998, and 1.2% in 1999). .
113. Trinka, 305 F.3d at 108 (quoting Virgin Ad. Airwaysv. British Airways,
257 F.3d 256, 272 (2d Cir. 2001».
114. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540
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a horizontal refusal-to-deal claim. The leveraging of the network to
preserve monopoly can be thought of as a special case of the verti-
cal price squeeze theory, discussed earlier in the context of the
1981 AT&T breakup, which waswell understood by economists, the
USDO], AT&T, and the judge implementing the MFJ.
To see this, consider the decomposition of the Verizon services
as shown in Figure 3. If Verizon leases UNEs to rivals at a price
above cost, it can foreclose any rival for which Verizon's UNEs are
required to produce local telecommunications services.
Figure 3: Competition in Local Telecommunications Services
NET services + Retailing services
+ 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
] + [AT&T or other non-Verizon] Verizon
+
Verizon ] + [ Verizon
Verizon provides NET services to its own retailing services divi-
sion at its cost VERIZONCNET.115 Combined with retailing services, such.
as billing and marketing, for which Verizon collects per unit reve-
nue PRETAlUNG, Verizon sells the end-ta-end service at price:
VERIZONPLOCAL = VERIZONCNET + VERIZONPRETAlLlNG.
If Veri;lOnleases UNEs, or sells NET services, to rivals in the retail-
ing services market at an above-cost price, i.e.: '
VERIZONPNET). VERIZONCNET,
then an equally efficient competitor in retailing, say AT&T, would
be forced out of business because it would have to charge a higher
price than Verizon to final customers for local telecommunications
service. Assuming equal efficiency in providing retailing services
between AT&T and Verizon, i.e.,
AT&TPRETAlLlNG = VERIZONPRETAlLlNG,
we can see that the price that AT&T charges for local telecommuni-
cations services will be higher than Verizon's:
115. In discussing costs in this section, we assume that all costs calculations
are based on the same efficient cost TELRlG methodology. As discussed above,
under TELRIC, ILECs are permitted to recover the network costs, certain over-
head costs and a reasonable rate of return. Thus, VERIZONPNET > VERIZONCNET in all
circumstances, even if Verizon does nothing additional to raise its rivals' costs
(through liNEs or otherwise).
oJ
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AT&TPLOCAL = VERIZONPNET + AT&TPRETAILING =
. VERIZONPNET + VERIZONPRETAILING >
VERIZONCNET + vERIZONPRETAILING = VERIZONPLOCAL.
Therefore, if AT&T leases UNEs (buys NET services) from Verizon
above cost, AT&T is forced to sell local telecommunications services
above the price at which Verizon sells them:
AT&TPLOCAL > VERIZONPLOCAL.
Thus, AT&T or any other rival in local telecommunications which
has to lease UNEs from Verizon can be foreclosed.
B. ForeclosureThrough Raising Rivals' Costs
. Alternatively, now suppose that Verizon is forced by regulators
to lease UNEs (sell NET services) at cost. Then Verizon cannot di-
rectly set a price for such services above cost, but Verizon can use
raising rivals' costs strategies towards its competitors in retailing ser-
vices, such as delays and quality decreases, so that it increases the
effective cost of NET services to them, VERIZONPRRCNET,116 to an
amount above its cost for such services:
VERIZONPRRCNET > VERIZONCNET.
Then, using the same argument as in the previous section, faced
with higher effective costs for NET services, equally efficient retail-
ing competitors will have to charge a higher price than Verizon's
VERIZONPLOCAL and will therefore be foreclosed from retailing services.
That is, a rival that is equally efficient with Verizon in retailing,
AT&TPRETAILING = VERIZONPRETAILING,
will be forced to sell local telecommunications services at a higher
price than Verizon:
AT&TPLOCAL =VERIZONPRRCNET + AT&TPRETAILING =
VERIZONPRRCNET + VERIZONPRETAILING >
VERIZONCNET + VERIZONPRETAILING = VERIZONPLOCAL.
Therefore, when Verizon implements raising rivals' costs strategies,
AT&T is forced to sell local telecommunications services above the
price at which Verizon sells them:
AT&TPLOCAL > VERIZONPLOCAL'
116. VERIZONPRRCNET is the effective cost of NET services faced by Verizon local
service rivals as a result ofVerizon's raising rivals' costs actions.410 NYU ANNUAL SURVEYOF AMERlCAN LAW [Vol. 61:379
Thus, Verizon can use raising rivals' costs strategies to leverage its
monopoly in NET services so that it forecloses its competitors in
local telecommunications services, Moreover, Verizon has an in-
centive to do so, since this strategy allows it to maintain its profita-
ble monopoly in local telecommunications services.
VI.
APPLICATION OF THE PROFIT
"SACRIFICE PRINCIPLE"
In deciding Trinko, the Supreme Court failed to articulate a
clear general rule under which specific conduct will be found to
constitute "willfulmonopolization." The Government's briefiil this
case proposed such a standard based on the "sacrifice principle."117
In my definition of the sacrifice principle, a defendant is liablefor
anticompetitive behavior if its conduct "involves a sacrifice of short-term
profits orgoodwillthat makessense only insofar as it helPsthe defendant
maintain or obtainmonopolypower."118This definition coincides only
partially with the definition of the same principle in the Govern-
ment's brief. The Government's brief allows all behavior that does
not involve sacrifice of short term profits to be characterized as not
"exclusionary" and not "predatory."119 I disagree. Conduct can be
117. Brief of Amici Curiae United States and the Federal Trade Commission
at 16, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S.
398 (2004) (No. 02-682).
118. ABthe Government brief notes, the sacrifice principle has been used in
AspenSkiing,472 U.S.at 608, 610-11 (conduct that "sacrifice[s]short-run bene-
fits," such as immediate income and consumer goodwill, undertaken because it
"reduc[es] competition. . . over the long run"); General Indus. Corp. v. Hartz
Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1987) (conduct anticompetitive if "its
'anticipated benefits were dependent upon its tendency. to discipline or eliminate
competition and thereby enhance the firm's long term ability to reap the benefits
of monopoly power.'"); Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518,
523-24 n.3 (5th Cir. 1999) (conduct exclusionary if it harms the monopolist but is
justified because it causes rivals more harm); Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Rad-
ford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 148 (4th Cir. 1990) ("making a short term sacri-
fice" that "harm[s] consumers and competition" to further "exclusive, anti-
competitive objectives"). Brief of Amici Curiae United States and the Federal
Trade Commission at 16, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (No. 02-682).
119. "Conduct is not exclusionary or predatory unless it would make no eco-
nomic sense for the defendant but for its tendency to eliminate or lessen competi-
tion." Brief of Amici Curiae United States and the Federal Trade Commission at
15, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398
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exclusionary even without a sacrifice of short term profits.12O But
when such a sacrifice is observed, it points directly to this conduct
as being anti-competitive.
Thus, I am not endorsing the sacrifice principle as a single cri-
terion to be used in ascertaining anti-competitive behavior because
there can be cases where there is no short-term profit sacrifice but
conduct does not make sense except to attain or retain monopoly
power. If an action involves a sacrifice of profits that cannot be
justified except to the extent that it helps a company to create, pro-
tect, or enhance monopoly power, there is little doubt that such an
action is anti-competitive.
I note that vertical leveraging as analyzed above passes the "sac-
rifice test." In the particular actions alleged in Trinko it is clear that
the behavior ofVerizon to raise the costs of rivals in local telecom-
munications services entailed a sacrifice of profits from potential
leases of the local telecommunications network to entrants in the
retail market, and that this sacrifice would not have occurred ifVer-
izon were not trying to protect its monopoly in the retail market for
local telecommunications services. Thus; under the sacrifice princi-
ple, Verizon's actions are found to be anti-competitive.
In particular, if Verizon did not have a retailing division and
did not try to preserve its monopoly in retailing, it would have no
incentive to foreclose or disadvantage independent retailing firms.
In fact, if its strategy were not to preserve its monopoly position in
retailing, Verizon would have had every incentive to sell its NET
services to all, even at prices of cost plus reasonable pr.ofit as man-
dated by the Telecommunications Act. Since Verizon sells its NET
services to its retailing division at cost while any NET services price
sold to third parties includes a reasonable profit, raising rivals' costs
actions that disadvantage third party retailing firms and result in
smaller sales of NET services to these firms clearly impose a sacrifice
of profits for Verizon. Thus, one could apply the "sacrifice" princi-
ple in the Trinka case, in the same way that the Supreme Court
articulated it in Aspen Skiing, to conclude that Verizon's raising ri-
vals' costs actions result in a sacrifice of revenue and therefore
would not have been taken except to preserve its monopoly.
120. For example, a dominant firm may allow a buyer to buyits product only
if it does not buy products from a competitor. Such a contract can be easily char-
acterized as e1fclusionary even though it may not involve a sacrifice of profits.412 NYU ANNUAL SURVEYOF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 61:379
VII.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
From an economist's point of view, Trinko is a poor decision
that will enhance and preserve the monopoly ofVerizon and other
RBOCs who remain near-monopolists in local telecommunications
markets. The Supreme Court focused narrowly on the horizontal
issues of the case and missed the leveraging of monopoly power
from the network infrastructure market to the retail telecommuni-
cations market. Both of these markets were at the time monopo-
lized by Verizon, but the retail telecommunications market faced
the possibility of significant competition if Verizon adhered to the
terms of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in leasing network
infrastructure to its rivals in the retail market. This paper shows
that Verizon had incentives to leverage its monopoly in network in-
fnistructure so as to preserve its monopoly in the retail market.
This could be done through various strategies that raised rivals'
costs and otherwise disadvantaged competitors. The issue of use of
non-price strategies of raising rivals' costs was particularly,impor-
tant because of the price regulation imposed by the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996. The Supreme Court ignored these issues and
decided this case in the context of Aspen Skiing where regulation
was absent.
Even in the context of Aspen Skiing, however, the Court erred
in its application of precedent. The Supreme Court had affirmed
that Aspen Skiing's action of not selling its tickets to a competitor
(who wanted to sell them as a bundle with its own)'was anti-compet-
itive. Comparing the Aspen Skiing facts to those of Trinko, one can,
expect that Verizon would be more likely to refuse to sell at lower
but still above cost prices than at higher prices since that company's
revenue would be lower at lower prices. That is, from the point of
view of the company committing the anti-competitive act, the incen-
tive tolrefuse to sell to competitors is higher in Trinko than in Aspen
and therefore, everything else being equal, refusal to deal is more
likely to occur in Trinko than in Aspen. If the. refusal to deal of the
duopolist in Aspen Skiing is anti-competitive, the refusal to deal by
the monopolist in Trinkoshould be even more damning. Thus, the
Court failed to apply in Trinko the logic of the argument it had used
to deem the actions in Aspen Skiing anti-competitive.
In the particular actions alleged in Trinko, it is clear that the
behavior ofVerizon to raise the costs of rivals in local telecommuni-
cations services entailed a sacrifice of Verizon's profits from net-
work leases that were not signed because Verizon was trying to
protect its local telecommunications monopoly. Thus, under the \
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sacrifice principle, Verizon's actions were anti-competitive. Overall,
the Supreme Court's Trinko decision missed the essence of the anti-
competitive behavior involved.